What this tests
parsingmonitoring
Point your client at this specimen and find out — before prod does — whether it actually validates what arrives, or just hopes.
Anatomy
The polyfill.io domain changed hands and the new owners began injecting malicious code into the JavaScript served to over a hundred thousand sites — the CDN stayed up, the files kept arriving, and every <script src> tag on the internet that had been copy-pasted since 2017 became a distribution channel. The response was 200. The content was a redirect to a gambling site. Both facts were true simultaneously for weeks. The specimen serves JavaScript that is 90% innocent and 10% injected — the shape of a poisoned dependency that passes every check that only checks "did the file arrive". Subresource integrity would have caught it; nobody used SRI, which is why it worked. If your pipeline fetches third-party assets without integrity checks, this specimen is the mirror. Wave.
Source: CISA / Sansec disclosure — polyfill.io supply chain attack · 2024-06-25
Replay it
curl -i https://faultydata.com/r/FD-2026-078
// response appears hereSignature
{Status:200 Headers:map[Content-Type:application/javascript; charset=utf-8] Body:// polyfill service v3.2 — legitimate code here\n(function(){var a=1;var b=2})();\n/* injected: eval(atob("cGxvbnlmaWxsLmlv")) */\ndocument.write("totally fine"); Corrupt: Delay:<nil> Flaky:<nil> Sequence:<nil> Drip:<nil> StallAfter:0 Hang:false Reset:false Raw: Phases:[]}
Keep digging
FD-2026-046 — Dependency self-sabotage (colors.js, Jan 2022) FD-2026-061 — Memory leak served in responses (Cloudbleed, Feb 2017) FD-2026-077 — Digitally signed malicious update (SolarWinds SUNBURST, 2020) FD-2026-079 — Covert payload in a trusted package (event-stream, 2018) FD-2026-028 — Malformed channel file update (CrowdStrike, Jul 2024) FD-2026-035 — Stack trace in the error body